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PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS:
FUNDAMENTAL THEOREMS AND
ROBUST UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
JEREMY STAUM
Abstract. We prove fundamental theorems of asset pricing for good deal bounds in in-
complete markets, relating arbitrage-freedom and uniqueness of prices to existence and
uniqueness of a pricing kernel with appropriate properties. The technology employed is
duality of convex optimization in locally convex linear topological spaces. The concepts
investigated are closely related to convex and coherent risk measures, exact functionals,
and coherent lower previsions in the theory of imprecise probabilities. We apply the results
to analyze a speciﬁc method for constructing good deal bounds, based on robust expected
utility involving a unanimity rather than a maxmin criterion.
1. Introduction
The problem of pricing and hedging in incomplete markets demands a synthesis of the
approaches of mathematical ﬁnance and economics: how does one hedge risks and establish
preferences over residual, unhedgeable risks, and what implications does this have for pricing
risks? At the same time, one must take account of the cost of hedging, as determined by cur-
rent market prices, and of beliefs about future market prices and of fundamental preferences,
which do not derive solely from current or historical market prices. In mathematical terms,
the problem of pricing in incomplete markets is the problem of extending a function that
gives the prices of marketed cashﬂows to a larger space of cashﬂows. The cashﬂows in the
larger space but not the smaller marketed space are potential over-the-counter securities. The
extension should have economic justiﬁcation and be suitable for implementation by ﬁnancial
decision makers. The problem is important because the incorporation of features such as
price jumps, transaction costs, and illiquidity into a model often yields incompleteness.
One approach to this problem arises from the consideration of equivalent martingale mea-
sures (EMMs) in no-arbitrage pricing theory. Under some conditions, market prices equal
expected discounted terminal values, with the expectation taken under an EMM (DS99). In
incomplete markets, there can be many EMMs, and one may propose criteria for selecting
one. Expectation under this most-favored EMM is then the chosen extension of the mar-
ket price function. Two criteria that have attracted extensive attention are minimization
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of hedging residual variance (Sch96) and minimization of the relative entropy between the
EMM and a subjective probability measure (Fri00b).
Another approach arises from consideration of the lower and upper no-arbitrage bounds
for prices of nonredundant contingent claims. It analyzes tighter good deal bounds, which
arise from the exclusion not only of arbitrages, but a larger acceptance set of good deals
(CSR00). Recently, research in this area has taken inspiration from the work on coherent
risk measures of Artzner et al. (ADEH99). It explicitly aims at creating a theory that
occupies an intermediate position between no-arbitrage and expected utility theory, being
more useful than the former and more robust than the latter. Recent papers include Carr et
al. (CGM01), ˇ Cern´ y and Hodges (ˇ CH01), Jaschke and K¨ uchler (JK00), and Roorda (Roo02).
An investigation that similarly seeks to interpolate between no-arbitrage and expected utility
theories, although not explicitly treating price bounds, is Frittelli (Fri00a). See (CGM01)
and (ˇ CH01) for further discussion of the relative merits and disadvantages of no-arbitrage
and expected utility theories, as well as references to previous work along the same lines by
economists not drawing on the coherent risk measure concept. The present paper continues
the approach inspired by coherent risk measures, but is not restricted to the coherent case.
The ﬁrst part of this paper (§§2–7) is an extension of the results of Jaschke and K¨ uchler
(JK00). We drop some assumptions of coherence and resolve some diﬃculties surrounding
the converse in the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The main tool is the duality
theory of optimization in locally convex linear topological spaces. We use as a recurring
example the case of bounded random variables, which several authors have treated in diﬀerent
contexts: Delbaen (Del02) and F¨ ollmer and Schied (FS02a; FS02b; FS02c) on coherent and
convex risk measures, Maaß (Maa02) on exact functionals, and Walley (Wal91) on imprecise
probabilities. The second part of the paper (§§8–10) applies these results to a concrete
proposal for pricing and hedging derivative securities in incomplete markets using imprecise
beliefs and utilities. This grounds a generalization of the results of Carr et al. (CGM01) in
expected utility concepts. It is also similar to F¨ ollmer and Schied’s (FS02b) use of Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s (GS89) maxmin expected utility to create an example of a convex risk measure.
The important economic diﬀerences from that approach are that the method proposed here
relies on a unanimity criterion which is more conservative when used for derivative security
pricing, and that pricing depends on the trader’s current portfolio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate no-good-deal price
bounds and conditions for them to avoid arbitrage. Section 3 covers ﬁnancial interpretations
of the mathematical hypotheses needed for subsequent results. Sections 4 and 5 develop
respectively the dual and primal results required for proving versions of the fundamental
theorems of asset pricing, which occupy Section 6. In Section 7 we focus on the important
special case of bounded random variables. A discussion of the proposed criterion of unanimity
in expected utility occupies Section 8, while Section 9 analyzes this proposal, drawing on
the results of Part I. We brieﬂy discuss issues surrounding calibration and computation in
Section 10. We conclude and discuss directions for future research in Section 11.PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 3
PART I: FUNDAMENTAL THEOREMS
2. Acceptance and Pricing
Let L be a linear space of cashﬂows for which we desire to establish bid and ask prices.
We will derive results for pricing where L is endowed with a locally convex topology and
paired with a dual space: see Section 4. The reader may consult the appendix of Jaschke
and K¨ uchler (JK00) for an introduction to locally convex linear topological spaces and their
duality theory.
Let L+ ⊂ L be the subset of nonnegative cashﬂows. We assume that it is a cone, meaning
a convex, absolutely homogeneous set, where absolutely homogeneous means positively ho-
mogeneous and containing 0. We do not assume that it has any “nice” topological properties,
such as closedness or nonempty interior; see Example 3.1 for an example where it has empty
interior.
Standing Assumption 2.1. L is a linear space and L+ ⊆ L is a cone.
We model the market with a function π : L 7→ (−∞,∞] giving market prices. It has the
interpretation of an ask price, that is, if you purchase x, you must pay π(x), whereas if you
sell x, you receive π(−x). Naturally, the 0 cashﬂow costs 0. To avoid some trivial cases, we
assume there exist cashﬂows of both positive and negative price.
Standing Assumption 2.2. There is a market ask pricing function π : L → (−∞,∞]
taking both positive and negative values, and with π(0) = 0.
The eﬀective domain of π is the subset R ⊆ L of cashﬂows that are marketed, or replicable;
elsewhere π takes the value ∞. Our goal is to establish bid and ask prices for over-the-counter
securities providing cashﬂows in L \ R.
Important special cases are those in which π is linear on a linear eﬀective domain R, sub-
linear (convex and absolutely homogeneous), or convex. Linearity corresponds to frictionless
markets. Sublinearity allows for proportional transaction costs, i.e. a ﬁxed bid-ask spread
for any transaction size. Convexity is consistent with more general transaction costs, trading
constraints, and liquidity eﬀects.
The set of cashﬂows you can have for free is M:={x|π(x) ≤ 0} − L+, while the set of
valuable and riskless cashﬂows is L+\{0}, and the set of cashﬂows you can sell for cash now
is C:={x|π(−x) < 0}. An element of M ∩ (L+ \ {0}) is an arbitrage. An element of M ∩ C
will be called a cashout. It is sometimes also called an arbitrage, but the distinction between
these concepts is important enough here to warrant diﬀerent names. Let a near-arbitrage be
an element of cl(M)∩(L+ \{0}). The ﬁnancial signiﬁcance of being “near” depends on the
topology in which the closure is taken.
Remark 2.1. If the topology is the strong topology of the k · k∞-norm, a near-arbitrage is
known as a free lunch with vanishing risk: see Delbaen and Schachermayer (DS99).
Let A ⊆ L denote an acceptance set, that is, the set of cashﬂows that one is willing to
accept without compensation. Say a set A is monotone when A + L+ ⊆ A. We will assume
the acceptance set is monotone; this represents a modicum of ﬁnancial rationality.
Standing Assumption 2.3. A is nonempty and monotone.4 JEREMY STAUM
For purposes of derivative security pricing, one interprets x ∈ L as a change in wealth, so
0 is the status quo. Then it makes sense to have 0 ∈ A. (From the perspective of portfolio
optimization, x ∈ L is a wealth, and 0 might very well not be acceptable.) Monotonicity
and 0 ∈ A imply L+ ⊆ A. Pure losses should be unacceptable: A ∩ (L− \ {0}) = ∅. Given
our interpretation of contingent claims as changes in wealth, we will call an acceptance set
A rational when it satisﬁes these three properties: monotonicity, acceptability of the status
quo, and unacceptability of pure losses. These are equivalent to a subset of the axioms for
coherent risk measures (ADEH99). Another interesting property is convexity of A, which
corresponds to risk-aversion. We do not assume that any of these properties other than
monotonicity holds, but they feature as hypotheses of some results.
Remark 2.2. Both π and A may depend on one’s current portfolio. For instance, consid-
erations of credit risk suggest that the price received for issuing liabilities in a state of the
world depends on one’s wealth in that state. A contingent claim’s acceptability may depend
on whether it hedges or exacerbates risks already present in the portfolio.
When we are willing to accept any claim x ∈ A, from our counterparty’s point of view,
the set of cashﬂows to be had for free is M −A. We can also describe the set A−M as our
hedging-aware acceptance set. We would like this set to satisfy the conditions:
• NC(π,A): (M − A) ∩ C = ∅
• NA(π,A): (M − A) ∩ L+ \ {0} = ∅
• NNA(π,A): cl(M − A) ∩ L+ \ {0} = ∅
These stand for “No Cashout,” “No Arbitrage,” and “ No Near-Arbitrage,” respectively.
Remark 2.3. Although the concepts are not quite equivalent, the condition NA(π,A) relates
to (the absence of) Jaschke and K¨ uchler’s (JK00) good deals of the ﬁrst kind, while NC(π,A)
relates to their good deals of the second kind, or good deals simply.
Deﬁne our ask and bid prices for a cashﬂow x as
(1) aπ,A(x):= inf
y∈L
{π(y)|y − x ∈ A} = inf
y∈R
{π(y)|y − x ∈ A}
and
(2) bπ,A(x):= − aπ,A(−x) = sup
y∈R
{−π(y)|x + y ∈ A}.
We should interpret aπ,A(x) as an unattained inﬁmum selling price for x. Receiving any
amount more than aπ,A(x) while taking on the cashﬂow −x, we will be able to hedge accept-
ably and retain some proﬁt. Getting exactly aπ,A(x) would result at best in indiﬀerence.
Using L+ as an acceptance set, we get the no-arbitrage bounds aπ,L+ and bπ,L+ for pricing
and hedging in incomplete markets. If L+ ⊆ A, then bπ,A ≥ bπ,L+ and aπ,A ≤ aπ,L+, so we
get a bid-ask spread no less tight than the no-arbitrage bounds. If there is no arbitrage in
market prices, then for all y ∈ R, π(y) = aπ,L+(y).
Proposition 2.1. The ask aπ,A is monotone. If 0 ∈ A, then aπ,A ≤ π. If A and π are
convex, then aπ,A is convex. If A and π are positively homogeneous, then aπ,A is positively
homogeneous; if moreover 0 ∈ A, then aπ,A is absolutely homogeneous.PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 5
Proof. Monotonicity of aπ,A follows from monotonicity of A: if x2 ≥ x1, then x2+A ⊆ x1+A,
so the inﬁmum in aπ,A(x2) is taken over a smaller set. If 0 ∈ A, then x − x ∈ A, so
aπ,A(x) ≤ π(x).
Consider x1,x2 ∈ L and y1,y2 ∈ R such that y1 − x1,y2 − x2 ∈ A, that is, y1 and y2
are feasible in computing aπ,A(x1) and aπ,A(x2) respectively. If A is convex, for γ ∈ [0,1],
γ(y1 − x1) + (1 − γ)(y2 − x2) ∈ A. Because
γ(y1 − x1) + (1 − γ)(y2 − x2) = (γy1 + (1 − γ)y2) − (γx1 + (1 − γ)x2),
this shows that γy1+(1−γ)y2 is feasible in computing aπ,A(γx1+(1−γ)x2). If π is convex,
then π(γy1 + (1 − γ)y2) ≤ γπ(y1) + (1 − γ)π(y2), so
aπ,A(γx1 + (1 − γ)x2) ≤ γaπ,A(x1) + (1 − γ)aπ,A(x2),
and aπ,A is convex.
Consider x ∈ L and y ∈ R such that y − x ∈ A. If A is positively homogeneous, then for
λ > 0, λ(y − x) ∈ A. If π is positively homogeneous, then π(λy) = λπ(y). So aπ,A(λx) ≤
λaπ,A(x). But x = (1/λ)(λx), so aπ,A(x) ≤ (1/λ)aπ,A(λx). Therefore aπ,A(λx) = λaπ,A(x).
Because π(0) = 0, if moreover 0 ∈ A, aπ,A(0) = 0. 
We now formulate conditions under which the policy of selling a cashﬂow x for any price
more than an ask a(x) does not backﬁre by giving away a cashout or a near-arbitrage.
These conditions are generalizations of NC(π,A) and NNA(π,A), which dealt only with
transactions taking place at an inﬁmum price of zero: see Proposition 5.3 for more about
this relationship.
• NC(π,a): For any x ∈ L, a(x) + aπ,L+(−x) ≥ 0.
• NNA(π,a): For any x ∈ L and z ∈ L+ \ {0}, a(x) + aπ,L+(z − x) > 0.
When NC(π,aπ,A) holds, aπ,A does not give away a cashout: we can rewrite NC(π,aπ,A)
as aπ,A(x) ≥ bπ,L+(x), which shows that our counterparty must pay more than the lower
no-arbitrage bound for x. On the other hand, suppose NC(π,aπ,A) fails, i.e. d:=bπ,L+(x) −
aπ,A(x) > 0. For any  > 0, there exists y ∈ R such that x+y ∈ L+ and π(y) ≤ −bπ,L+(x).
Our counterparty could buy x from us for price p:=aπ,A(x)+d/3, choose  = d/3, and buy yd/3
on the market. This strategy has cost π(yd/3)+p ≤ (d/3−bπ,L+(x))+(bπ,L+(x)−d+d/3) =
−d/3 < 0, so our counterparty would get a cashout: a negative cost now with no future risk
from x + y ≥ 0.
Likewise, we can rewrite NNA(π,aπ,A) as aπ,A(x) > bπ,L+(x − z). Suppose this fails. For
any  > 0, there exists y ∈ R such that x − z + y ∈ L+ and π(y) ≤  − bπ,L+(x − z). For
any δ > 0, our counterparty could buy x from us for price p:=aπ,A(x)+δ/2 and buy yδ/2 on
the market. This strategy has cost π(yδ/2) + p ≤ (δ/2 − bπ,L+(x − z)) + (aπ,A(x) + δ/2) ≤ δ
and results in the cashﬂow x + yδ/2 ≥ z > 0. So our counterparty can get as least as much
as the ﬁxed, desirable cashﬂow z > 0 for any positive price δ, no matter how small. This
would not be giving away an arbitrage, but it would be arbitrarily close to doing so.6 JEREMY STAUM
Remark 2.4. One might consider demanding more, for instance, that one does not give away
a cashout in the course of selling several cashﬂows x1,...,xn:
n X
i=1
aπ,A(xi) ≥ bπ,L+
 
−
n X
i=1
xi
!
.
This relates to Walley’s (Wal91) criterion of “avoiding sure loss.” However, it appears
ﬁnancially inappropriate for two reasons. First, one’s acceptance set should change after a
trade. Suppose that before the trade, one possessed the cashﬂow v and had the acceptance
set A for changes. This corresponds to an acceptance set v + A for cashﬂows. If the trade
does not change one’s beliefs or preferences, then after selling x and acquiring the hedge y,
one’s position is v + y − x, and the new acceptance set for changes should be A + x − y.
Second, the act of acquiring the hedge y may have an eﬀect on market prices, due to limited
liquidity. (See C ¸etin et al. (C ¸JP) for an approach to understanding and modeling liquidity
costs.) To ignore the eﬀect of one’s trades on market prices is tantamount to assuming that
the market pricing function π is subadditive, as it would be possible to acquire y =
Pn
i=1 yi
for no more than
Pn
i=1 π(yi) by making n purchases in rapid succession. These considerations
suggest that we may focus on a single pricing decision.
3. Finite-Cost Hedging and Continuity
Some later results involve the hypothesis that the ask price of any cashﬂow be ﬁnite.
Like the mathematical conditions discussed so far, such as monotonicity and convexity, this
has a ﬁnancial meaning and is not merely a technical condition. It can be veriﬁed without
actually computing the ask by analyzing the relationship between the acceptance set A and
the market pricing function π.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Full Domain). Full domain for a function f means domf = L, i.e. ∀x ∈
L, f(x) < ∞.
What domaπ,A = L says is that for all x ∈ L, there exists y ∈ R such that y − x ∈ A.
Because L is linear, −x is always in L too, so this is equivalent to saying that every cashﬂow
becomes acceptable after hedging at ﬁnite cost. This condition could fail, in which case
we would need either a diﬀerent approach than the present for establishing fundamental
theorems, or to respecify the problem. One could attempt to price only cashﬂows that can
be acceptably hedged, that is, restrict L to be domaπ,A, or one could enrich A to include
some hedging residuals of the troublesome elements of L.
The following examples, which illustrate these points, have L = L0(R,B,P), with B the
Borel sigma-algebra on R, and P a probability measure. This is a space of random variables,
interpreted as contingent claims. It makes sense to say L+ is the set of P-almost surely
nonnegative contingent claims. First we observe that L+ has empty interior under any
vector topology T .
Example 3.1 (Empty interior of L0
+). Any x ∈ L+ has a ﬁnite essential inﬁmum. Consider
the non-null event E = {ω ∈ R|x(ω) < inf x+1} that it takes a value within 1 of its essential
inﬁmum. There is some other random variable xE that is essentially unbounded below on
E. Then L+ is not radial at x: for any δ > 0, x + δxE is not almost surely bounded below,PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 7
so it is not in L+. Therefore x is not in the T -interior of L+, because any T -open set is
radially open (JK00, Prop. 17).
In the following example, aπ,A does not have full domain, and we consider a way of
restricting the space L of cashﬂows to be priced in order to give aπ,A full domain.
Example 3.2 (Restricting aims). Let A be any acceptance set containing only contingent
claims that are almost surely bounded below by some K ≤ 0. That is, −K is a maximum
acceptable loss, or risk capital. Suppose the only marketed instrument is a riskless bond
whose payoﬀ is 1, and its unit price is 1 for transactions of any size. Then the marketed
subset R = R is the linear subspace of constants, and π is eﬀectively the identity. If x is
not almost surely bounded below, then it can not be acceptably hedged. For any c ∈ R,
x + c is still not almost surely bounded below, so aπ,A(−x) = ∞. We could restrict L to be
the linear subspace of almost surely bounded contingent claims, L∞(R,B,P). If x is almost
surely bounded by K, then x+K ∈ L+ ⊆ A, so x can be hedged acceptably at a cost of K.
The ﬁnal example considers expanding the acceptance set so that aπ,A has full domain.
The new acceptance set need not be convex: this is an example of how risk-seeking behavior
may arise.
Example 3.3 (Limited liability). The setting is the same as in Example 3.2. Now suppose that
the decision-maker enjoys limited liability and suﬀers the same consequences whenever the
contingent claim pays oﬀ less than K. This might be a trader who can at worst lose his job, or
a proprietor of a business empire who can at worst see the group’s bank go bankrupt. Let u be
a utility function on R, unbounded above. In the absence of risk management, the acceptance
set A might include any contingent claim x such that EP[u(x)1{x ≥ K}]+u(K)P[x < K] ≥
0. This is an expected utility calculation, accounting for a ﬁxed loss in the case of ruin.
(Because u(x)1{x ≥ K} is almost surely bounded below, the expectation exists, although
it might be ∞.) Now every x ∈ L can be acceptably hedged at ﬁnite cost, as follows. Pick
c,d ∈ R such that P[x ≥ c] > 0 and u(d) ≥ −u(K)P[x < c]/P[x ≥ c], and let z = x−c+d.
Then
E
P[u(z)1{z ≥ K}] + u(K)P[z < K]
= E
P[u(z)1{z ≥ d}] + E
P[u(z)1{K ≤ z < d}] + u(K)P[z < K]
≥ u(d)P[z ≥ d] + u(K)P[K ≤ z < d] + u(K)P[z < K]
= u(d)P[x ≥ c] + u(K)P[x < c]
because {z ≥ d} = {x ≥ c} by deﬁnition of z. By deﬁnition of d, this quantity is nonnegative,
so z ∈ A, which shows that x can be acceptably hedged for the ﬁnite cost d − c.
In using duality theory in Section 4, we will also be concerned with continuity of ask prices
with respect to some locally convex vector topology T on L.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Semi-Continuity). A function f is lower (upper) semi-continuous when,
equivalently,
• For any sequence {xn}n∈N converging to x, f(x) ≤ liminfxn→x f(xn), respectively
f(x) ≥ limsupxn→x f(xn).8 JEREMY STAUM
• For any α ∈ R, the set {x|f(x) ≤ α} is closed, respectively {x|f(x) ≥ α} is closed.
• For any α ∈ R, the set {x|f(x) > α} is open, respectively {x|f(x) < α} is open.
Together, the two semi-continuities imply ordinary continuity. Because T is a vector
topology, lower semi-continuity of aπ,A is equivalent to upper semi-continuity of bπ,A, as
follows. Lower semi-continuity of aπ,A is openness of {x|aπ,A(x) > α} = {x| − bπ,A(−x) >
α} = −{x|bπ,A(x) < −α} for all α, which is equivalent to openness of {x|bπ,A(x) < α} for
all α.
Remark 3.1. The Fatou property for risk measures discussed by Delbaen (Del02) is lower
semi-continuity with respect to the topology of bounded convergence in probability. See also
Example 4.1.
It turns out that in the sublinear case, ﬁnite-cost hedging is a suﬃcient condition for the
existence of a topology with respect to which the ask price is continuous. This will help us in
our analysis of duality, where we will want to choose some such topology in order to look at
an appropriate dual space of continuous linear functionals, because we can be sure that one
exists. Here we prove that the lc-topology, the ﬁnest locally convex vector topology, makes
the ask continuous.
Proposition 3.1. If π is sublinear, A is a cone, and domaπ,A = L, then aπ,A is lc-
continuous.
Proof. From Proposition 2.1, it follows that aπ,A is sublinear.
First, we show that aπ,A is upper semi-continuous with respect to the lc-topology. This
means showing that the set a
−1
π,A([−∞,α)) = {x|aπ,A(x) < α} is lc-open for all α ∈ R.
Any convex, radially open set is lc-open (JK00, Lem. 10(iv)). Because aπ,A is convex,
a
−1
π,A([−∞,α)) is convex. It remains to show that it is radial at all its points. Consider
x such that aπ,A(x) < α and any u ∈ L. If aπ,A(u) ≤ 0, then for any γ ≥ 0,
aπ,A(x + γu) ≤ aπ,A(x) + γaπ,A(u) ≤ aπ,A(x) < α,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from sublinearity of aπ,A. If aπ,A(u) > 0, pick a positive
δ < (α − aπ,A(x))/aπ,A(u), which is positive and ﬁnite. Then for any γ ∈ [0,δ],
aπ,A(x + γu) ≤ aπ,A(x) + γaπ,A(u) ≤ aπ,A(x) + δaπ,A(u) < α.
Whether aπ,A(u) is positive or not, x + γu is in a
−1
π,A([−∞,α)) for all suﬃciently small
nonnegative γ, so it is radially open.
Finally, we show that aπ,A is lower semi-continuous with respect to the lc-topology. This
means showing that the set a
−1
π,A([−∞,α]) is lc-closed for all α ∈ R. Any convex, radially
closed set with nonempty radial interior is lc-closed (JK00, Prop. 19). Because aπ,A is convex,
a
−1
π,A([−∞,α]) is convex. It contains a
−1
π,A([−∞,α)), which has just been shown to be radially
open, and is nonempty by the following Lemma 3.1. Therefore it has nonempty radial
interior, and it remains to show that it is radially closed, or equivalently, that a
−1
π,A((α,∞]) is
radially open. Consider any point w at which a
−1
π,A((α,∞]) is not radial. There exists u ∈ L
such that for all δ > 0, there exists γ ∈ [0,δ] such that aπ,A(w + γu) ≤ α. By deﬁnition of
the ask, the sale of w +γu can be hedged acceptably for any cost exceeding α: for all  > 0,
there exists y such that π(y) ≤ α +  and y − (w + γu) ∈ A. Because domaπ,A = L, therePRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 9
exists yu such that π(yu) < ∞ and yu + u ∈ A. Because A is a cone, the combination of
acceptable cashﬂows is acceptable:
(y − (w + γu)) + γ(yu + u) = y − w + γyu ∈ A.
Because π is sublinear,
π(y + γyu) ≤ π(y) + γπ(yu) ≤ α +  + γπ(yu).
So aπ,A(w) is less than or equal to this quantity, for arbitarily small positive  and γ. Because
π(yu) < ∞, this proves aπ,A(w) ≤ α, i.e. w / ∈ a
−1
π,A((α,∞]). Therefore a
−1
π,A((α,∞]) is radial
at all its points. 
Lemma 3.1. If π is positively homogeneous and 0 ∈ A, then for all α ∈ R, there exists x
such that aπ,A(x) < α.
Proof. It suﬃces to prove this for α < 0. By Assumption 2.2, there exists x0 such that
π(x0) < 0. Choose λ > α/π(x0), which is positive. Then by positive homogeneity, π(λx0) =
λπ(x0) < α. Because 0 ∈ A, aπ,A ≤ π, by Proposition 2.1. 
4. Duality
In this section, we establish a framework for dualization and ﬁnd a dual representation
for the ask aπ,A and bid bπ,A. This dual representation is of computational interest and is an
ingredient in the fundamental theorems of Section 6.
We say (L,T ) and (L0,T 0) are paired spaces when T and T 0 are locally convex vector
topologies and there is a bilinear form h·,·i : L × L0 → R such that {h·,x0i|x0 ∈ L0} is the
set of continuous linear functionals on L, and vice versa. For this, ∀x0 ∈ L0,hx,x0i = 0 must
imply x = 0, and vice versa.
Remark 4.1. The largest space L0 for which this can be done is L×, the algebraic dual of L,
consisting of all linear functions on L, in which case L must be equipped with the lc-topology,
the ﬁnest in which it is locally convex.
Standing Assumption 4.1. (L,T ) and (L0,T 0) are paired spaces.
Example 4.1 (Two pairings). The space of bounded random variables L∞(Ω,F,P), under
the strong topology T∞ of the k · k∞-norm, pairs with ba(Ω,F,P), the space of ﬁnitely
additive measures absolutely continuous with respect to P. However, we might prefer to
pair it with ca(Ω,F,P), the space of σ-additive measures absolutely continuous with respect
to P. To do so requires a coarser topology on L∞(Ω,F,P), with fewer open sets and
more convergence, in order to support fewer continuous linear functionals, i.e. pair with a
smaller space. This coarser topology turns out to be the topology of bounded convergence
in probability. This can be veriﬁed directly from the deﬁnition of the topology induced on
L∞(Ω,F,P) by ca(Ω,F,P) (DS58)[V.3.2]. It can also be seen from results in (Del02) and
(FS02b), where the Fatou property for a coherent or convex risk measure, which is lower
semi-continuity with respect to bounded convergence in probability, is shown to be equivalent
to existence of a dual representation of the risk measure in terms of σ-additive probability
measures.10 JEREMY STAUM
Jaschke and K¨ uchler (JK00, Cor. 9) have a version of the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of
asset pricing which involves the condition that A − M be a closed cone, so that the bipolar
theorem applies to it. They suggest ﬁnding conditions for closedness or a way to alter the
set M so that A − M would be closed. Instead, we shift focus to a diﬀerent set
(3) B:={x|bπ,A(x) ≥ 0} = {x|aπ,A(−x) ≤ 0}
which turns out to be the closure in question, under some conditions.
The right and left polar cones of a set B ⊆ L and of a set B0 ⊆ L0 are respectively
B
∗:={x
0 ∈ L
0|∀x ∈ B,hx,x
0i ≥ 0} and
∗B
0:={x ∈ L|∀x
0 ∈ B
0,hx,x
0i ≥ 0}.
The bipolar theorem implies that B = ∗(B∗) if B is a closed cone.
Proposition 4.1. If π is sublinear, A is a cone, and aπ,A is continuous, then cl(A − M) =
B = ∗(B∗).
Proof. It follows from Proposition 2.1 that B is a cone. If aπ,A is lower semi-continuous,
then B is closed. Once B is a closed cone, the bipolar theorem (JK00, Thm. 20) applies.
It follows from the deﬁnition of B that it contains A − M. Therefore it suﬃces to show
that the radial interior of B is a subset of A−M to establish that B is the radial closure of
A−M. Consider any x in the radial interior of B. For all u ∈ L, there exists δ > 0 such that
x + δu ∈ B, i.e. for all  > 0, there is a y such that π(y) ≤  and x + δu + y ∈ A. Choose u
such that π(u) < 0. Then π(δu+y) ≤ δπ(u)+ by subadditivity. This is negative for small
enough positive . Therefore x ∈ A − M. This establishes that B is the radial closure of
A−M. By Lemma 3.1 and upper semi-continuity of aπ,A, it has nonempty interior. When a
convex set has nonempty interior, its closure equals its radial closure (JK00, Prop. 18). 
Remark 4.2. Radial closure is the condition given by F¨ ollmer and Schied (FS02a) for an
acceptance set that generates a convex risk measure to equal the acceptance set generated
by that convex risk measure.
The translation invariance property of Jaschke and K¨ uchler’s numeraire allows them to
prove a fundamental theorem of asset pricing as a direct consequence of the comparison of
A − M and ∗((A − M)∗). The connection does not seem so direct here. Instead, we apply
duality theory to the ask aπ,A in the usual way for minimizations, resulting in Theorem 4.1.
Deﬁne the penalty function Ψ on L0 by
(4) Ψ(x
0):=sup
x∈A
(−hx,x
0i) + sup
y∈R
(hy,x
0i − π(y)).
The ﬁrst term has an interpretation as the extent to which x0 disagrees about the desirabil-
ity of cashﬂows in A. It is (in a more abstract setting) the minimal penalty function in the
convex risk measure representation theorems of (FS02a), up to change of sign. Likewise,
the second term measures the disagreement between x0 and market prices, which π speciﬁes.
Now we can ﬁnd a dual representation for the ask and bid, in the same spirit as the repre-
sentation theorems for coherent and convex risk measures. This is the dual ingredient in the
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Theorem 4.1. For all x ∈ L,
bπ,A(x) ≤ inf
x0∈L0(hx,x
0i + Ψ(x
0)) (5)
aπ,A(x) ≥ sup
x0∈L0
(hx,x
0i − Ψ(x
0)). (6)
If moreover aπ,A is lower semi-continuous, and π and A are convex, then equality holds.
Proof. The statements about bπ,A and aπ,A are equivalent. We focus on aπ,A because its
primal problem is a minimization, which is more usually studied in the convex optimization
literature. The primal value is infy∈L{π(y)|y−x ∈ A}. Our framework for dualization is the
function F : L × L → (−∞,∞] given by
F(y,u) =
(
π(y) if y − (x + u) ∈ A
+∞ otherwise
where u has the interpretation of a perturbation to x, the cashﬂow to be priced. The optimal
value function is
φ(u) = inf
y∈L
F(y,u) = inf
y∈L
{π(y)|y − (x + u) ∈ A} = aπ,A(x + u).
The Lagrangian K : L × L0 → [−∞,∞] is given by K(y,x0) = infu∈L(F(y,u) + hu,x0i) and
the dual objective by g(x0) = infy∈L K(y,x0), so we get
g(x
0) = inf
y,u∈L
(F(y,u) + hu,x
0i) = inf
y,u∈L
{π(y) + hu,x
0i|y − (x + u) ∈ A}.
The dual value is supx0∈L0 g(x0) = supx0∈L0 g(−x0), so we can exclude from this maximization
those values of x0 such that g(−x0) = −∞. We substitute z = y − (x + u) so the constraint
in the minimization that yields g(−x0) is z ∈ A. The objective is
π(y) − hu,x
0i = π(y) − hy − x − z,x
0i = hx,x
0i + hz,x
0i + (π(y) − hy,x
0i).
Therefore
g(−x
0) = hx,x
0i + inf
z∈A
hz,x
0i + inf
y∈L
(π(y) − hy,x
0i)
= hx,x
0i − sup
z∈A
(−hz,x
0i) − sup
y∈L
(hy,x
0i − π(y)),
which is the supremand in formula (6). Duality theory asserts that the primal value is greater
than or equal to the dual value, justifying the inequality in (6). If A and π are convex, then
F is convex. When F is convex, the dual value is liminfu→0 φ(u) (Roc74, Thm. 7). The
primal value is φ(0), so lower semi-continuity of aπ,A (hence of φ) implies no duality gap. 
When equality holds, −bπ,A is a convex risk measure. F¨ ollmer and Schied (FS02a) deﬁned
a convex risk measure to have ρ(1) = −1 for mathematical convenience. If one were to adopt
instead the deﬁnition of Artzner et al. (ADEH99), that the risk measure should merely be
additive with respect to some numeraire 1 of unit price, then the following proposition would
hold with the hypothesis that π(c1) = c for all c ∈ R.
Proposition 4.2. If π(c) = c for all c ∈ R, then −infx0∈L0(h·,x0i + Ψ(x0)) is a convex risk
measure.12 JEREMY STAUM
Proof. As in the proof of Thm. 5 of (FS02a), fx0(x):=hx,x0i + Ψ(x0) is concave, monotone,
and constant-additive for each x0, and these properties are preserved by taking the inﬁmum.
If h·,x0i is monotone, fx0 is monotone. If not, there exists y ∈ L+ such that hy,x0i < 0.
By Assumption 2.3, there exists z ∈ A such that for all λ ≥ 0, z + λy ∈ A. Therefore
supx∈A(−hx,x0i) ≥ supλ≥0(−hz + λy,x0i) = supλ≥0(−hz,x0i − λhy,x0i) = ∞. So fx0(x) =
Ψ(x0) = ∞, which is monotone anyway. Similarly, if hc,x0i = c for all c ∈ R, we have
constant-additivity, and if not, supy∈R(π(y) − hy,x0i ≥ supc∈R(c − hc,x0i) = ∞, and we get
constant-additivity anyway, because ∞ + c = ∞. 
5. Sublinearity and Cones
In this section, we relate the case where π is sublinear and A is a convex cone, described
in Propositions 3.1 and 4.1, to the more general case, where π and A need not have these
properties. We rely on some deﬁnitions and notation relating sets to cones and functions
to sublinear functions. For any set C, let C∨ be the smallest cone containing C. For any
function f, let conv f be given by
(conv f)(x):=inf
(
n X
i=1
λif(xi)
   

n X
i=1
λixi = x,
n X
i=1
λi = 1,xi ∈ dom f,λi ≥ 0
)
.
This is the greatest convex function dominated by f. Let ah f be given by
(ah f)(x):=inf{λf(x/λ)|λ > 0}
for x 6= 0, and (ah f)(0):=0. If f is convex, f(0) < ∞, and f 6= ∞, this is the greatest
absolutely homogeneous function dominated by f; see (Roc70§5). Let f∨:=conv ah f, which
is given by
f∨(x) = inf
(
n X
i=1
λif(xi)
    
n X
i=1
λixi = x,xi ∈ dom f,λi ≥ 0
)
.
This is the greatest sublinear function dominated by f. In what follows, we may write down
only the interesting constraints in this minimization.
The greatest sublinear function dominated by the ask aπ,A is the ask generated from the
acceptance set A∨ and market pricing function π∨.
Proposition 5.1. (aπ,A)∨ = aπ∨,A∨.
Proof. Making the substitutions y =
Pn
i=1 λiyi and zi = yi − xi,
(conv ah aπ,A)(x) = inf
(
n X
i=1
λiaπ,A(xi)
    
n X
i=1
λixi = x
)
= inf
(
n X
i=1
λiπ(yi)
  
 
yi − xi ∈ A,
n X
i=1
λixi = x
)
= inf {π∨(y)| zi ∈ A,
n X
i=1
λizi = y − x
)
= inf{π∨(y)|y − x ∈ A∨}.PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 13

Deﬁne the marginal ask and bid by
(7) ˜ aπ,A(x):=liminf
λ→∞
λaπ,A(x/λ) and ˜ bπ,A(x):=limsup
λ→∞
λbπ,A(x/λ).
These are the most favorable prices that a counterparty who wants to execute a small trade
can come close to attaining. The following proposition gives conditions under which these
also equal the prices generated from the acceptance set A∨ and market pricing function π∨.
Lemma 5.1. If f is convex and f(0) ≤ 0, then (ah f)(x) = limλ→∞ λf(x/λ).
Proof. By convexity, for λ1 ≥ λ2 > 0,
f(x/λ1) ≤

1 −
λ2
λ1

f(0) +

λ2
λ1

f(x/λ2),
so λ1f(x/λ1) ≤ (λ1 −λ2)f(0)+λ2f(x/λ2) ≥ λ2f(x/λ2). Hence λf(x/λ) is nondecreasing as
a function of λ > 0. Thus the inﬁmum in the deﬁnition of (ah f) is a limit. 
Proposition 5.2. If A is convex and contains 0, and π is convex, then ˜ aπ,A = aπ∨,A∨ =
limλ→∞ λaπ,A(x/λ) and ˜ bπ,A = bπ∨,A∨ = limλ→∞ λbπ,A(x/λ).
Proof. By Proposition 2.1, aπ,A is convex and has aπ,A(0) ≤ 0. By Lemma 5.1, the limit
exists, so
˜ aπ,A(x) = liminf
λ→∞
λaπ,A(x/λ) = lim
λ→∞
λaπ,A(x/λ) = (ah aπ,A)(x) = (aπ,A)∨(x) = aπ∨,A∨(x),
because aπ,A is already convex, and using Proposition 5.1. Then bπ∨,A∨(x) = −aπ∨,A∨(−x) =
−limλ→∞−λbπ,A(x/λ) = limλ→∞ λbπ,A(x/λ). 
Next we prove a result, relating conditions on π and A to conditions on π∨ and A∨, that
is the primal ingredient in the fundamental theorems. In a sense, we are a considering a
ﬁctitious market in which π∨ gives the prices and A∨ is our acceptance set. This enables us
to connect the case actually under consideration with the sublinear case, in which Proposi-
tions 3.1 and 4.1 will apply.
Let ˜ M:={x|π∨(x) ≤ 0} − L+ and ˜ C:={x|π∨(−x) < 0} be the set of cashﬂows you
could respectively have for free and sell for cash now if π∨ gave market prices. Likewise
let ˜ B:={x|aπ∨,A∨(−x) ≤ 0}. These are not necessarily the same as M∨, C∨, and B∨.
Lemma 5.2. The following are monotone cones: A∨ ⊆ A∨ − ˜ M ⊆ ˜ B.
Proof. Because π∨(0) = 0, 0 ∈ ˜ M, so A∨ ⊆ A∨− ˜ M. If x = z−y where z ∈ A∨ and π∨(y) ≤ 0,
then x + y ∈ A∨, so bπ∨,A∨(x) ≥ −π∨(y) ≥ 0, and x ∈ ˜ B. This shows A∨ − ˜ M ⊆ ˜ B. By
construction, A∨ and ˜ M are cones, which makes A∨− ˜ M a cone. By Proposition 2.1, aπ∨,A∨ is
convex and absolutely homogeneous, so ˜ B is a cone. By Assumption 2.3, A is nonempty and
monotone, so any cone containing A contains L+. Any cone K has the property K+K ⊆ K,
so L+ ⊆ K implies K + L+ ⊆ K, i.e. K is monotone. 
Proposition 5.3. Among the conditions
(1) NC(π,A): (M − A) ∩ C = ∅14 JEREMY STAUM
(2) NC(π,aπ,A): aπ,A(x) + aπ,L+(−x) ≥ 0
(3) NC(π∨,aπ∨,A∨): aπ∨,A∨(x) + aπ∨,L+(−x) ≥ 0
(4) NC(π∨,A∨): ( ˜ M − A∨) ∩ ˜ C = ∅
the following implications hold: (4) ⇔ (3) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (1). If A is convex and contains 0, and
π is convex, then all the conditions are equivalent.
Proof. (4) ⇒ (3): Suppose aπ∨,A∨(x)+aπ∨,L+(−x) < 0. There exist y1,y2 such that y1 −x ∈
A∨, y2+x ∈ L+, and π∨(y1)+π∨(y2) < 0. Then by monotonicity of A∨, the sum y1+y2 ∈ A∨,
while by subadditivity of π∨, π∨(y1+y2) < 0. So A∨∩(− ˜ C) is nonempty, and by Lemma 5.2,
this is enough.
(3) ⇒ (4): Same as (2) ⇒ (1).
(3) ⇒ (2): Because π∨ ≤ π and A ⊆ A∨, aπ,A ≥ aπ∨,A∨ and aπ,L+ ≥ aπ∨,L+.
(2) ⇒ (1): Suppose there exists x in the set (M − A) ∩ C, so π(−x) < 0 and x = y − z
where z ∈ A and π(y) ≤ 0. Then aπ,L+(−x) ≤ π(−x) < 0, while aπ,A(x) ≤ π(y) ≤ 0 because
y − x = z ∈ A. So aπ,A(x) + aπ,L+(−x) < 0.
(1) ⇒ (4): Here assume A is convex and contains 0, and π is convex. Suppose there exists
−x ∈ ( ˜ M − A∨) ∩ ˜ C. That is, π∨(x) < 0 and x = z − y where z ∈ A∨ and π∨(y) ≤ 0.
By subadditivity, π∨(z) ≤ π∨(x) + π∨(y) < 0. So there exists z ∈ A∨ ∩ (− ˜ C). For some
λ1 > 0, [0,λ1z] ⊂ A. For some λ2 > 0, π is negative on the line segment (0,λ2z]. Let
λ = min{λ1,λ2}, so (0,λz] ⊂ A∩(−C). Therefore A∩(−C) is nonempty, containing λz for
some λ > 0. By Lemma 5.2, this is enough. 
This result oﬀers some guidance about choosing an acceptance set A. If π is convex and we
choose a convex (risk-averse) acceptance set A that contains 0 and satisﬁes (M −A)∩C = ∅,
then we can be sure of satisfying the desideratum NC(π,aπ,A).
Having established this connection between results for (π,A) and for (π∨,A∨), we can now
revisit the dual problem (6). The dual-feasible set is D0:={x0|Ψ(x0) < ∞}. For use in the
fundamental theorems, we consider the dual-feasible set when market prices are given by π∨
and the acceptance set is A∨. Deﬁne ˜ Ψ as the penalty function Ψ in equation (4) with these
substitutions, and ˜ D0:={x0|˜ Ψ(x0) < ∞}. Call an element of ˜ D0 a consistent pricing kernel:
item (4) below shows that it is consistent with the acceptance set and market prices. We
now collect some properties of these objects.
Proposition 5.4. Given the preceding deﬁnitions,
(1) The following are equivalent: x0 ∈ A∗, supx∈A(−hx,x0i) ≤ 0, x0 ∈ (A∨)∗, and
supx∈A∨(−hx,x0i) = 0.
(2) The following are equivalent: h·,x0i ≤ π, supy∈R(hy,x0i−π(y)) = 0, h·,x0i ≤ π∨, and
supy∈R(hy,x0i − π∨(y)) = 0.
(3) The function ˜ Ψ takes values in {0,∞}.
(4) The set ˜ D0 = {x0|˜ Ψ(x0) = 0} = {x0|Ψ(x0) = 0} = (A∨)∗ ∩ {x0|h·,x0i ≤ π∨} =
A∗ ∩ {x0|h·,x0i ≤ π}, that is, x0 is a consistent pricing kernel if and only if it is
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Proof. (1) Recall that the deﬁnition of A∗ is {x0|∀x ∈ A, hx,x0i ≥ 0}, which shows the
equivalence of x0 ∈ A∗ and supx∈A(−hx,x0i) ≤ 0. The equivalence of x0 ∈ (A∨)∗ and
supx∈A∨(−hx,x0i) = 0 is similar, with the added observation that this supremum is nonneg-
ative because 0 ∈ A∨. From A ⊆ A∨ it follows that (A∨)∗ ⊆ A∗. Now consider x0 ∈ A∗.
Each x ∈ A∨ is a nonnegative linear combination of elements of A, at each of which h·,x0i is
nonnegative. Therefore h·,x0i is nonnegative at x, so x0 ∈ (A∨)∗. This shows A∗ = (A∨)∗.
(2) Because π∨(0) = π(0) = 0, h·,x0i ≤ π and supy∈R(hy,x0i − π(y)) = 0 are equivalent,
and likewise h·,x0i ≤ π∨ and supy∈R(hy,x0i − π∨(y)) = 0 are equivalent. From π∨ ≤ π it
follows that h·,x0i ≤ π∨ implies h·,x0i ≤ π. Now suppose h·,x0i ≤ π. For any nonnegative
linear combination
Pn
i=1 λixi = x, hx,x0i =
Pn
i=1 λihxi,x0i ≤
Pn
i=1 λiπ(xi). So π∨(x) is the
greatest lower bound of a set bounded below by hx,x0i, therefore h·,x0i ≤ π∨.
(3) Both terms in ˜ Ψ are nonnegative and absolutely homogeneous.
(4) From part (3), ˜ D0 = {x0|˜ Ψ(x0) = 0}. Then parts (1) and (2) imply the conclusion. 
Remark 5.1. If π is linear and x0 is a consistent pricing kernel, then h·,x0i is a linear extension
of π.
6. Fundamental Theorems
Now we get two versions of the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing, one each for
NC(π,aπ,A) and NNA(π,aπ,A). The 0th version does not quite deserve the name, because it
relates only to absence of cashouts, not absence of arbitrage. In interpreting the hypothesis of
lower semi-continuity for aπ∨,A∨, recall that by Proposition 3.1, domaπ∨,A∨ = L is suﬃcient
for the existence of a locally convex topology in which aπ∨,A∨ is continuous. Moreover,
because aπ∨,A∨ ≤ aπ,A, domaπ∨,A∨ = L is weaker than domaπ,A = L, the more natural
hypothesis of ﬁnite-cost hedging. See also Proposition 7.2 for a simple suﬃcient condition
for continuity of aπ∨,A∨ in the strong topology of L∞(Ω,F,P).
Theorem 6.1 (0th FTAP). The existence of a consistent pricing kernel implies NC(π,aπ,A).
If moreover A is convex and contains 0, π is convex, and aπ∨,A∨ is lower semi-continuous,
then the converse holds.
Proof. By Proposition 5.4, a consistent pricing kernel satisﬁes ˜ Ψ(x0) = 0. Then Theorem 4.1
implies bπ∨,A∨ ≤ infx0∈ ˜ D0h·,x0i ≤ h·,x0i ≤ π∨. Therefore π∨(x) < 0 implies x / ∈ ˜ B. By
Lemma 5.2, A∨ − ˜ M is a subset of ˜ B, so this implies that A∨ − ˜ M and {x|π∨(x) < 0} = − ˜ C
are disjoint. This in turn implies NC(π,aπ,A), by Proposition 5.3.
Given the extra hypotheses, NC(π,aπ,A) implies that for all x ∈ L, aπ∨,A∨(x)+aπ∨,L+(−x) ≥
0, by Proposition 5.3. Because L+ ⊆ A∨, aπ∨,A∨(0) ≤ aπ∨,L+(0) ≤ 0, so aπ∨,A∨(0) = 0. From
Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 5.4 it follows that aπ∨,A∨(0) = supx0∈ ˜ D0h0,x0i = supx0∈ ˜ D0 0.
Therefore ˜ D0 6= ∅, i.e. a consistent pricing kernel exists. 
The following theorem deserves to be called a ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing,
because NNA(π,aπ,A) rules out giving away arbitrages. By a strictly monotone x0, we mean
one for which h·,x0i is strictly monotone, i.e. for all x ∈ L+ \ {0}, hx,x0i > 0. The theorem16 JEREMY STAUM
shows that existence of a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel is suﬃcient, but estab-
lishes its necessity only under hypotheses not only of convexity but also homogeneity, or in
relation to the marginal ask.
Theorem 6.2 (1st FTAP). The existence of a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel
implies NNA(π,aπ,A). If A is convex and contains 0, π is convex, and aπ∨,A∨ is lower
semi-continuous, then ∀x ∈ L+ \ {0},˜ aπ,A(x) > 0 is equivalent to the existence of a strictly
monotone consistent pricing kernel. If moreover A is a convex cone and π is sublinear, then
NNA(π,aπ,A) is equivalent to the existence of a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel.
Proof. Suppose NNA(π,aπ,A) fails, so there are x and z > 0 such that aπ,A(x)+aπ,L+(z−x) ≤
0. Then aπ∨,A∨(x) + aπ∨,L+(z − x) ≤ 0, and equivalently, bπ∨,A∨(−x) ≥ aπ∨,L+(z − x). By
deﬁnition of the bid bπ∨,A∨ and ask aπ∨,L+, for any  > 0, there are ya,yb such that yb−x ∈ A∨,
ya + x − z ∈ L+, and π∨(yb) ≤  − π∨(ya). Because A∨ is monotone, we can add to get
ya + yb − z ∈ A∨. By subadditivity, π∨(ya + yb) ≤ . As this can be done for all positive
, bπ∨,A∨(−z) ≥ 0, so −z ∈ ˜ B, and ˜ B ∩ (L− \ {0}) 6= ∅. By the following Lemma 6.1, this
implies there is no strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel.
Now assume A is convex and contains 0, π is convex, and aπ∨,A∨ is lower semi-continuous.
By Proposition 5.2, ˜ aπ,A = aπ∨,A∨. Therefore ∀x ∈ L+ \ {0},˜ aπ,A(x) > 0 is equivalent to
∀x ∈ L+\{0},aπ∨,A∨(x) > 0, which is in turn equivalent to ˜ B∩(L−\{0}) = ∅. By Lemma 6.1,
this is equivalent to the existence of a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel.
Now assume A is a convex cone and π is sublinear. Then A = A∨ and π = π∨, so aπ,A =
aπ∨,A∨. Suppose there is no strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel. By Lemma 6.1,
this implies there exists −z ∈ ˜ B ∩ (L− \ {0}). Then bπ∨,A∨(−z) ≥ 0, so aπ∨,A∨(z) ≤ 0, and
aπ∨,A∨(z)+aπ∨,L+(z−z) ≤ 0. That is, aπ,A(z)+aπ,L+(z−z) ≤ 0, violating NNA(π,aπ,A). 
Lemma 6.1. The existence of a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel implies ˜ B ∩
(L− \ {0}) = ∅. If aπ∨,A∨ is lower semi-continuous, then the converse holds.
Proof. Suppose x0 is a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel. From Theorem 4.1 we get
bπ∨,A∨(x) ≤ hx,x0i. For x < 0, this implies bπ∨,A∨(x) < 0, thus x / ∈ ˜ B. The converse is an
application of the same “exhaustion” argument that underpins the Halmos-Savage theorem,
as explained by Delbaen in a proof of a similar result (Del02, Thm. 3.5). Consider the class
of sets C:={C ⊆ L+|∃x0 ∈ ˜ D0 3 ∀x ∈ C,hx,x0i > 0}. From Proposition 5.4(4), we can
see that ˜ D0 is convex and contains only nonnegative elements. Therefore class C is stable
under countable unions: take a sequence {Cn}n∈N ⊆ C, and let x0
n ∈ ˜ D0 be such that for all
x ∈ Cn, hx,x0
ni > 0. Deﬁne x0:=
P∞
n=1 2−nx0
n ∈ ˜ D0. Then any x ∈ ∪n∈NCn is in Cj ⊆ L+
for some j, so hx,x0i = hx,
P
n6=j 2−nx0
ni + hx,2−jx0
ji ≥ 2−jhx,x0
ji > 0. From stability under
countable unions, it follows by Zorn’s lemma that C has a maximal element. It is given in the
converse that for any x > 0, bπ∨,A∨(−x) < 0, i.e. aπ∨,A∨(x) > 0. By Theorem 4.1, given lower
semi-continuity, aπ∨,A∨(x) = supx0∈ ˜ D0hx,x0i. Therefore for any x > 0, there is an x0 ∈ ˜ D0
such that hx,x0i > 0, i.e. {x} ∈ C. Thus the only possible maximal element of C is L+ \{0},
and L+ \ {0} ∈ C implies the existence of x0 ∈ ˜ D0 such that for all x > 0, hx,x0i > 0, which
is a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel. PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 17
The following example shows that NNA(π,aπ,A) does not imply NNA(π∨,aπ∨,A∨), which
is equivalent to the existence of a strictly monotone consistent pricing kernel. This accounts
for the diﬃculty in framing a partial converse.
Example 6.1 (Trouble with non-closed cones). Let L = R2, the space of contingent claims
in a two-state, one-period economy, T be the Euclidean norm topology, and the acceptance
set A = L+ ∪ {x|x2 ≥ x2
1}, which is closed, convex, monotone, and contains 0. Then
A∨ = L+ ∪ {x|x2 > 0}, as follows. First we show L+ ∪ {x|x2 > 0} ⊆ A∨. It is clear that
L+ ⊆ A ⊆ A∨. For the other points x, for which x1 < 0 and x2 > 0, deﬁne λ:=x2
1/x2 ∈
(0,∞), so x2/λ = (x1/λ)2. Such a point is thus a positive multiple of an element of A,
hence in A∨. Next we show A∨ ⊆ L+ ∪ {x|x2 > 0}, equivalently, (L+ ∪ {x|x2 > 0}){ ⊆ A{
∨.
The set (L+ ∪ {x|x2 > 0}){ = {x|x2 < 0} ∪ {x|x1 < 0,x2 = 0}, which is a positively
homogeneous set disjoint from A, which is convex. Therefore it is also disjoint from A∨.
The new conic acceptance set A∨ is still disjoint with L− \{0}, but its closure is not, which
causes a problem. Let M be the embedding of R, namely {x|x2 = x1}, and π(c) = c = π∨(c).
Consider a contingent claim z = (d,0) with d > 0, which is in L+ \ {0}. Letting x = z,
NNA(π∨,aπ∨,A∨) is violated, because aπ∨,A∨(x) = 0 and aπ∨,L+(z − x) = 0. On the other
hand, NNA(π,aπ,A) is not violated here, because aπ,A(x) = d + (1 −
√
1 + 4d)/2 > 0 and
aπ,L+(z−x) = 0. A pricing kernel is a point x0 ∈ R2, using the usual Euclidean inner product
hx,x0i = x1x0
1 +x2x0
2. A consistent pricing kernel must have hx,x0i ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A, and in
particular for (−d,d2) where d > 0. But d(dx0
2 −x0
1) = −dx0
1 +d2x0
2 ≥ 0 for all d > 0 implies
x0
1 = 0, so a consistent pricing kernel can not be strictly monotone.
Next we have a kind of second fundamental theorem of asset pricing, relating uniqueness
of pricing to uniqueness of consistent pricing kernel.
Theorem 6.3 (2nd FTAP). First, if bπ,A = aπ,A, then D0 and ˜ D0 contain at most one
element. If moreover aπ,A is lower semi-continuous, A is convex and contains 0, and π is
convex, then D0 = ˜ D0 is a singleton. Second, if there is a unique consistent pricing kernel
x0 and A is convex and contains 0, π is convex, and aπ∨,A∨ is lower semi-continuous, then
the marginal bid and ask are equal: ˜ bπ,A = ˜ aπ,A = h·,x0i. If moreover π is sublinear, A is a
cone, and aπ,A is lower semi-continuous, then bπ,A = aπ,A = h·,x0i.
Proof. First, given bπ,A = aπ,A, consider x0
1,x0
2 ∈ D0. The inequalities in expressions (5) and
(6) imply
max{hx,x
0
1i − Ψ(x
0
1),hx,x
0
2i − Ψ(x
0
2)} ≤ aπ,A(x)
= bπ,A(x) ≤ min{hx,x
0
1i + Ψ(x
0
1),hx,x
0
2i + Ψ(x
0
2)}.
Now suppose x0
1 6= x0
2. Then there exists ˜ x such that the diﬀerence d = h˜ x,x0
1 − x0
2i 6= 0.
We know Ψ(x0
1) + Ψ(x0
2) < ∞ by deﬁnition of D0. So we can pick a real number λ >
(Ψ(x0
1) + Ψ(x0
2))/d, and let x = λ˜ x. Now
hx,x
0
1i − Ψ(x
0
1) > (hx,x
0
2i + Ψ(x
0
1) + Ψ(x
0
2)) − Ψ(x
0
1) = hx,x
0
2i + Ψ(x
0
2).
This contradicts the above inequality, so x0
1 = x0
2, i.e. D0 contains at most one element. From
Proposition 5.4, it follows that ˜ D0 ⊆ D0. Under the additional hypotheses, equality holds in18 JEREMY STAUM
Theorem 4.1. This implies h·,x0i − Ψ(x0) = aπ,A = bπ,A = h·,x0i + Ψ(x0), so Ψ(x0) = 0, i.e.
x0 ∈ ˜ D0.
Second, given ˜ D0 = {x0} and the initial hypotheses, from Theorem 4.1 we get bπ∨,A∨ =
h·,x0i = aπ∨,A∨, and from Proposition 5.2, aπ∨,A∨ = ˜ aπ,A and bπ∨,A∨ = ˜ bπ,A. Given the further
hypotheses, by Proposition 2.1, the bid and ask are already sublinear, so bπ,A = (bπ,A)∨ and
aπ,A = (aπ,A)∨. By Proposition 5.1, (bπ,A)∨ = bπ∨,A∨ and (aπ,A)∨ = aπ∨,A∨. 
There are other approaches to framing a second fundamental theorem of asset pricing.
Carr et al. (CGM01) relate uniqueness of a certain pricing kernel to a notion of “acceptable
completeness.” An acceptably complete market is one in which all cashﬂows can be hedged
so that they are barely acceptable, i.e. one is indiﬀerent between the hedged cashﬂow and 0.
Mathematically speaking, the barely acceptable hedged cashﬂow is on the boundary of the
closed acceptance set. Jarrow and Madan (JM99) relate uniqueness of a signed equivalent
local martingale measure to completeness in the traditional sense of exact replicability of
contingent claims.
7. Bounded Random Variables
To make matters more concrete, we examine the case where L = L∞ = L∞(Ω,F,P), the
space of P-equivalence classes of bounded F-measurable random variables (functions) on
Ω. Here we can draw connections to the established theories of exact functionals, imprecise
probabilities, and convex risk measures. In this setting, we can identify simple suﬃcient
conditions for ﬁnite cost hedging and continuity of aπ∨,A∨.
Our primal space is L∞ with the strong topology of the k · k∞-norm, under which it is a
Banach space. Its positive orthant L∞
+ = {x ∈ L∞|x ≥ 0} with the usual partial ordering
generated by the essential inﬁmum: x1 ≤ x2 when essinf(x2 − x1) ≥ 0.
Our dual space L0 is ba = ba(Ω,F,P), the Banach space of bounded, ﬁnitely additive,
signed measures µ deﬁned on the σ-algebra F and absolutely continuous with respect to P.
Then h·,µi will be written Iµ(·) to denote a (Radon) integral, and {Iµ|µ ∈ ba} is the strong
dual of bounded linear functionals on L. For the pairing, it has the weak* topology. The
positive orthant ba+ contains those measures µ such that µ(E) ≥ 0 for every event E in F;
equivalently, those monotone linear functionals Iµ such that x1 ≤ x2 ⇒ Iµ(x1) ≤ Iµ(x2). We
also have a norm on the dual given by kµk = kIµk = supkxk∞≤1 |Iµ(x)|, which is Iµ(1) = µ(Ω)
when µ ∈ ba+.
It can be convenient to assume that one can buy or sell unlimited amounts of a riskless
bond with payoﬀ 1. This assumption is equivalent to R ⊆ R. We get by with a weaker
hypothesis, that every contingent claim is dominated by a marketed claim. This is equivalent
to R ⊆ R−L+, the availability of a marketed claim dominating any number of riskless bonds.
Proposition 7.1. If R ⊆ R − L+ then domaπ,A = L.
Proof. By Assumption 2.3, there exists z0 such that z ≥ z0 implies z ∈ A. The hypothesis
implies that for any x ∈ L, there exists y ∈ R such that y ≥ esssupx + esssupz0, so
y − x ≥ z0 and thus is in A. Therefore aπ,A(x) ≤ π(y) < ∞. PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 19
To prove continuity of aπ∨,A∨, we use the hypothesis that any contingent claim would be
dominated by a marketed claim if prices were given by π∨. Letting ˜ R be the eﬀective domain
of π∨, this is equivalent to 1 ∈ ˜ R − L+, a weaker hypothesis than R ⊆ R − L+.
Proposition 7.2. If 1 ∈ ˜ R − L+, then aπ∨,A∨ is continuous.
Proof. Consider any α ∈ R and x ∈ L such that aπ∨,A∨(x) > α. There exists γ > α such
that π∨(y) < γ implies y − x / ∈ A∨. There exists y1 ∈ ˜ R such that y1 ≥ 1. Pick β ∈ (α,γ)
and δ:=(γ − β)/|π∨(y1)| ∈ (0,∞]. Consider any y with π∨(y) < β. By subadditivity,
π∨(y + δy1) ≤ π∨(y) + δπ∨(y1) < γ, so y + δy1 − x / ∈ A∨. For any u in the δ-ball at x,
u ≥ x − δ ≥ x − δy1, so by monotonicity, y − u ≤ y + δy1 − x is also not in A∨. Therefore
aπ∨,A∨(u) ≥ β > α, and {x|aπ,A(x) > α} is open. Thus aπ∨,A∨ is lower semi-continuous.
Now consider any α ∈ R and x ∈ L such that aπ∨,A∨(x) < α. There exists y ∈ ˜ R
such that π∨(y) < α and y − x ∈ A∨. Again, there exists y1 ∈ ˜ R such that y1 ≥ 1. Let
δ:=(α−π∨(y))/(2max{1,π∨(y1)}). For any u in the δ-ball at x, u ≤ x+δ, so δy1 +y −u ≥
y − x + δ(y1 − 1) ≥ y − x, and hence by monotonicity, δy1 + y − u ∈ A∨. By subadditivity,
π∨(δy1 + y) ≤ δπ∨(y1) + π∨(y) ≤ (α − π∨(y))/2 + π∨(y) < α. Therefore aπ∨,A∨(u) < α, and
{x|aπ,A(x) < α} is open. Thus aπ∨,A∨ is upper semi-continuous. 
We now draw connections with the theory of exact functionals, for which see Maaß
(Maa02). An absolutely homogeneous, superadditive, real-valued functional is called su-
perlinear. In particular, it is concave. A monotone, superlinear functional is called super-
modular. A constant additive, supermodular functional is called exact. Constant additivity
of a functional Γ is Γ(x + c) = Γ(x) + Γ(c) when c ∈ R.
The theory of exact functionals centers on operators similar to the convexity and ab-
solute homogeneity operators deﬁned in Section 5, but with the opposite conventions, of
concavity. For instance, one considers the least monotone functional dominating Γ. To get
a supermodular functional, one applies successively the operators for positive homogeneity,
superadditivity, and monotonicity. Because the application of each operator does not spoil
the properties of the previous, the resulting functional given by
Γ∧(x):=(≤ sa ah Γ)(x) = sup
(
n X
i=1
λiΓ(xi)
    
n X
i=1
λixi ≤ x,n ∈ N,∀iλi ≥ 0,xi ∈ dom Γ
)
is indeed monotone, superadditive, and absolutely homogeneous. Therefore it is super-
modular as long as it is real-valued. Deﬁne the “norm” |Γ|:=Γ∧(1). It is nonnegative by
monotonicity and homogeneity, which implies Γ∧(0) = 0. It is a pseudonorm on a linear
space of exactiﬁable functionals on which it is ﬁnite-valued (Maa02, Prop. 2). When |Γ| is
ﬁnite, Γ∧ is real-valued, and may be called the natural supermodulariﬁcation of Γ. When
|Γ| < ∞, we may call Γ supermodulariﬁable.
The natural exactiﬁcation of an exactiﬁable functional Γ is Γ•:=(≤ ca sa ah Γ) given by
Γ•(x) = sup
(
n X
i=1
λiΓ(xi) + c|Γ|
    
n X
i=1
λixi + c ≤ x,c ∈ R,n ∈ N,∀iλi ≥ 0,xi ∈ dom Γ
)
.
When |Γ| < ∞, Γ• is exact, in particular, it is real-valued (Maa02, Thm. 2), and Γ is called
exactiﬁable; this is the same thing as supermodulariﬁability. Thus our concern with A∨,20 JEREMY STAUM
the cone generated by the acceptance set A, and with π∨, the greatest sublinear function
dominated by the market pricing function π, appears entirely analogous to the process of
exactiﬁcation.
The natural exactiﬁcation of an exactiﬁable functional Γ is the least exact functional
extending Γ and having the same norm as Γ (Maa02, Prop. 4). When Γ is exact, Γ• is
called its natural extension, and |Γ| coincides with the norm kΓk ordinarily given to linear
operators. This paper analyzes unnatural extensions aπ,A and bπ,A of market prices.
Very similar mathematical objects have been studied under diﬀerent names. An exact
functional with unit norm is a coherent lower prevision, and an exactiﬁable functional with
unit norm is a lower prevision avoiding sure loss (Wal91). When Γ is an exact functional, −Γ
is a coherent risk measure (ADEH99). This makes −Γ absolutely homogeneous, subadditive,
constant additive, and anti-monotone. A convex risk measure is a convex, constant additive,
anti-monotone functional (FS02a).
PART II: ROBUST UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
8. Unanimity in Expected Utility: Discussion
F¨ ollmer and Schied (FS02b) point out that one way of getting a convex risk measure is to
use the decision framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (GS89). One may assign to a bounded
contingent claim x ∈ L∞(Ω,F,P) the “robust” utility
(8) U(x) = inf
Q∈Q
EQ[u(x)],
where u is a utility function (a strictly increasing, concave function), and Q is a nonempty
set of probability measures. This approach is robust in the sense that it takes account of our
lack of knowledge about the probabilistic behavior of asset prices.
We assume that the probability measures in Q are absolutely continuous with respect to
a reference probability measure P. There is no reference probability measure in (FS02b);
we reintroduce it here to facilitate the analysis of no-arbitrage conditions. When the state
space Ω is uncountable, it seems easier to do this when L+ is the set of almost everywhere
nonnegative elements, rather than those that are everywhere nonnegative.
Choosing x to maximize U(x) is known as maxmin expected utility, as opposed to the
ordinary maximization of expected utility based on just one probability measure. Here the
contingent claims are being given the interpretation of random wealths, not of changes in
wealth. One can also take as the acceptance set the set of random wealths that provide at
least u0 robust expected utils. Then
ρ(x):= inf
c∈R
{c|U(cy0 + x) ≥ u0},
the number of shares of a numeraire y0 that must be added to x to produce a random wealth
providing at least u0 robust expected utils, is a convex risk measure (FS02b§4).
This result is of normative signiﬁcance, because it shows how to construct a risk measure
with good properties, starting from the economic primitives of beliefs and preferences over
nonstochastic outcomes. It has the virtue of taking into account ambiguity of beliefs by
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allow for multiple utility functions. This is what we want for a robust framework for pricing
and hedging in incomplete markets that will be more informative than no-arbitrage theory.
However, maxmin expected utility is not quite the right framework for that task. It ranks
random wealths, while we want to rank random changes in wealth. In other words, maxmin
expected utility is suitable for the portfolio optimization problem of choosing a random
wealth given an initial endowment: starting with x0 dollars and no other commitments at
time 0, we could maximize U(y) subject to the budget constraint π(y) = x0. It is not directly
suitable for the problem of derivative security pricing, in which we start with a pre-existing
random wealth v, which is in general nonzero. Then we want to set a price bπ,A(x) for a
change in wealth x such that buying x for less than bπ,A(x) and net costlessly hedging will
produce a random wealth v + x − y at least as desirable as v.
We suggest Gv deﬁned by
G
v(x) := inf
i∈I
g
v
i (x) (9)
g
v
i (x) := EPi[ui(v + x) − ui(v)] (10)
as the function generating an acceptance set
(11) A(G
v):={x|G
v(x) ≥ 0}.
Here I is a nonempty index set, and for each i we have an outlook (Pi,ui) consisting of a
subjective probability measure and a utility function. Again, all Pi are absolutely continuous
with respect to the reference probability measure P. It is important that the evaluation
Gv(x) depend on the current portfolio v ∈ L. Thus the acceptable claims are precisely
those that result in no diminution of expected utility under any outlook: there is a criterion
of unanimous (i.e. Pareto) improvement. Consequently the hedging residual x2 − x1 is
acceptable when it improves expected utility under every outlook.
One may envision the decision-making process as a requirement of unanimity among in-
vestment partners with diﬀerent outlooks. This is diﬀerent from the maxmin criterion, for
which x2 is preferred to x1 when the worst-case expected utility of x2 exceeds that of x1.
However, the expected utility of x2−x1 may be negative under some outlooks. With maxmin
expected utility, the decision-making process involves a Rawlsian (Raw71) criterion: the in-
vestment society prefers x2 to x1 because it enhances the subjective expected utility of the
least satisﬁed member, although it may harm others. In this sense, the unanimity criterion
is more conservative.
Another interpretation is that a single decision-maker entertains several outlooks, because
of imperfect knowledge of the objective probability measure and possibly of utility as well.
Then the unanimity criterion is also more conservative in the sense of robustness to the
inclusion or exclusion of outlooks. Using statistical jargon loosely, suppose we are testing the
null hypothesis that the status quo is the best opportunity available against the alternative
hypothesis that it would be preferable to buy another zero-cost contingent claim x, i.e. that
Gv(x) > 0 or U(v+x) > U(v). Suppose there are n outlooks, based on measures P1,...,Pn
and a common utility function u, and we are wondering whether or not to adopt another
outlook based on Pn+1. Type I error is buying x when it would not have been bought, based
on the right set of outlooks, and Type II error is not buying it when it would have.22 JEREMY STAUM
Under the maxmin scheme, either wrongly including or excluding Pn+1 can induce either
Type I or Type II error. Suppose Pn+1 is wrongly included, while the correct decision (based
on P1,...,Pn) is not to buy. If Pn+1 is the worst-case measure for v and EPn+1[u(v)] <
U(v + x), then the decision is reversed. In the same way, the erroneous inclusion of Pn+1
can reverse a correct decision to buy when Pn+1 is the worst-case measure for v + x and
EPn+1[u(v +x)] < U(v). In a similar way, wrongly excluding Pn+1 when it is the worst-case
measure for v + x can lead to Type II error, while wrongly excluding it when it is worst for
v can lead to Type I error.
Under the unanimity scheme, only erroneous exclusion can create Type II error, when
one wrongly excludes the only measures that make x look bad. If any of the original n
outlooks views the purchase of x unfavorably, it will not be bought, regardless of whether
other outlooks are wrongly included. Type I error occurs when one wrongly includes an
outlook under which x, which would otherwise have been bought, looks bad. Thus we can
be sure that we are erring on the side of caution by including many outlooks. Of course,
unanimity is a way of privileging the status quo, but in the business of derivative securities
trading, this should be interpreted as prudence, not as injustice. The status quo is safe,
there is a good business in doing deals that are known from experience to be better than
doing nothing, and there is danger in doing deals that one is not sure are beneﬁcial.
9. Unanimity in Expected Utility: Analysis
In this section, we analyze the properties of the acceptance set and bid-ask prices result-
ing from unanimity in expected utility. First, we compare it to convex and coherent risk
measures. Then we relate it to the valuation measure concept of Carr et al. (CGM01), and
apply the fundamental theorems to oﬀer a recipe for constructing arbitrage-free, economically
meaningful prices in incomplete markets.
The acceptance set based on unanimity in expected utility has some nice ﬁnancial prop-
erties that nothing (except in trivial cases) based on a coherent risk measure could have.
First, the acceptance set of a coherent risk measure is a cone, which implies that acceptable
claims are acceptable at unlimited scale. This dangerous behavior does not appear when
using the unanimity methodology.
Proposition 9.1. If any u0
i is unbounded, then no risky claim is acceptable at unlimited
scale: for all x ∈ A(Gv) \ L+, there exists λx such that λ ≥ λx implies λx / ∈ A(Gv).
Proof. Consider x ∈ A(Gv)\L+. There exists  > 0 such that the event E:={ω|x(ω) ≤ −}
has reference probability P[E] > 0. For any λ > 0,
g
v
i (λx) ≤ g
v
i (λ((supx)1E{ − 1E))
= EPi[1E{ui(v + λsupx) + 1Eui(v − λ) − ui(v)]
≤ Pi(E
{)ui(supv + λsupx) + Pi(E)ui(supv − λ) − ui(inf v).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to λ yields
Pi(E
{)(supx)u
0
i(supv + λsupx) − Pi(E)u
0
i(supv − λ).PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 23
Because u0
i is unbounded, i.e. limx→−∞ u0
i(x) = ∞, this expression is less than a strictly
negative number for large enough λ. Therefore its antiderivative, which dominates gv
i (λx),
is negative for large enough λ. 
Second, the acceptance set of a coherent risk measure has the form {x|infi∈I EPi[x] ≥ 0}.
If I is ﬁnitely generated (which allows {Qi}i∈I to be a polyhedron), as seems necessary
in practice, while L is inﬁnite-dimensional, then we expect that ∩i∈Iker(EPi) will contain
claims other than 0. Then such a claim x and −x will both be acceptable, risky claims.
Such behavior seems hard to justify economically, and it it does not occur when using the
unanimity methodology.
Proposition 9.2. If any u0
i is strictly decreasing, then x,−x ∈ A(Gv) implies x = 0.
Proof. Given x,−x ∈ A(Gv), we have EPi[ui(v+x)−ui(v)] ≥ 0 and EPi[ui(v−x)−ui(v)] ≥ 0.
So EPi[ui(v)] ≤ EPi[ui(v+x)]/2+EPi[ui(v−x)]/2. Because u0
i is strictly decreasing, ui(v) ≤
ui(v + x)/2 + ui(v − x)/2 with strict inequality when x(ω) 6= 0. Therefore {ω|x(ω) 6= 0} is
a P-null set, and x = 0. 
We also consider uniformity conditions on the utility functions and the measures. We may
want to require that infi∈I u0
i(x) > 0 or supi∈I u0
i(x) < ∞ for all x, or infi∈I(dPi/dP)(ω) > 0
or supi∈I(dPi/dP)(ω) < ∞ for all ω. These uniformity conditions mean that the collection
of outlooks does not reﬂect utter ignorance about marginal utility and the probabilities of
events. When there are a ﬁnite number |I| of outlooks, these uniformity conditions hold. On
the other hand, it is still permissible and indeed may be desirable that for each i we should
have u0
i and dPi/dP be unbounded on R and Ω respectively.
Example 9.1 (Unboundedness on R and Ω). Logarithmic utility has unbounded marginal
utility. We regard this function as ln : R → [−∞,∞), so expected utility is deﬁned for
all bounded contingent claims, although equal to −∞ for contingent claims that are not
almost surely nonnegative. The Radon-Nikodym derivative between the risk-neutral and
statistical probability measures in the Black-Scholes model is exp(−(kλk2/2)T−λWT), which
is unbounded on Ω.
The following proposition shows that this scheme produces rational, risk-averse acceptance
behavior. If the inputs do not reﬂect complete ignorance, then Gv detects strict dominance
of claims, and accepts some risky claim.
Proposition 9.3. The functions gv
i and Gv are concave and monotone, and the associated
acceptance sets A(gv
i ) and A(Gv) are convex and rational. Further, gv
i is strictly monotone.
If ∀x,infi∈I u0
i(x) > 0 and ∀ω,infi∈I(dPi/dP)(ω) > 0, then Gv is also strictly monotone. If
moreover P is nontrivial and ∀x,supi∈I u0
i(x) < ∞, then A(Gv) is strictly larger than L+.
Proof. For γ ∈ [0,1], write v + γx1 + (1 − γ)x2 = γ(v + x1) + (1 − γ)(v + x2). By concavity
of ui,
ui(v + γx1 + (1 − γ)x2) ≥ γui(v + x1) + (1 − γ)ui(v + x2).
Therefore gv
i (γx1 + (1 − γ)x2) ≥ γgv
i (x1) + (1 − γ)gv
i (x2), so gv
i is concave. Because the
inﬁmum of concave functions is concave, Gv is concave. This shows the acceptance sets are
convex. Because Gv(0) = gv
i (0) = 0, the acceptance sets contain 0.24 JEREMY STAUM
Consider x1 < x2. By concavity, ui(v+x2)−ui(v+x1) ≥ u0
i(sup(v+x2))(x2−x1). Because
ui is strictly increasing and the random variables are bounded, mi:=u0
i(sup(v + x2)) > 0.
There exist  > 0 and δi > 0 such that Pi(x2 − x1 ≥ ) = δi. Therefore
g
v
i (x2) − g
v
i (x1) = EPi[ui(v + x2) − ui(v + x1)] ≥ miδi > 0.
Thus gv
i is strictly monotone. From the hypotheses of uniform positivity, it would follow
that infi∈I mi and infi∈I δi are both positive, making Gv also strictly monotone.
From strict monotonicity of gv
i we get two consequences. First, it implies Gv is monotone:
x1 ≤ x2 ⇒ g
v
i (x1) ≤ g
v
i (x2) ⇒ G
v(x1) ≤ G
v(x2).
Monotonicity implies the acceptance sets are monotone. Second, for x < 0, we have gv
i (x) <
gv
i (0) = 0, and thus Gv(x) = infi∈I gv
i (x) < 0. This makes the acceptance sets disjoint with
L− \ {0}.
If P is nontrivial, there exists an event E ∈ F such that P(E) ∈ (0,1). From the unifor-
mity of the Radon-Nikodym derivative, it follows that p = infi∈I Pi(E) > 0. From the unifor-
mity hypotheses on marginal utility, ` = infi∈I u0
i(supv+1) > 0 and m = supi∈I u0
i(inf v−1) <
∞. Consider x = 1E − 1E{ for  ∈ (0,1].
g
v
i (x) = EPi[1E(ui(v + 1) − ui(v))] + EPi[1E{(ui(v − ) − ui(v))]
≥ Pi(E)u
0
i(supv + 1) − Pi(E
{)u
0
i(inf v − 1)
≥ p` − m.
This is nonnegative for some positive , so Gv(x) = infi∈I gv
i (x) ≥ 0. Then x is in A(Gv)
but not in L+, because it is negative on the non-null event E{. 
Remark 9.1. Due to diminution of marginal utility with increasing wealth, Gv need not be
constant additive, so −Gv need not be a convex risk measure. However, because A(Gv) is
a nonempty, convex, monotone set, it can be used to deﬁne a convex risk measure (FS02a,
Prop. 4).
Next we see that the fundamental theorems apply. Because v is bounded, u0
i(v) is positive
and bounded, so EPi[u0
i(v)] ∈ (0,∞). In analogy to Carr et al. (CGM01), we can deﬁne a
valuation measure Qv
i by
(12)
dQv
i
dPi
:=
u0
i(v)
EPi[u0
i(v)]
.
The marginal utility u0
i is strictly positive, so any absolute continuity properties are preserved.
Because of the normalization, Qv
i is indeed a probability measure. Deﬁne ˜ gv
i and ˜ Gv by
(13) ˜ g
v
i (x):=−(ah −g
v
i )(x) and ˜ G
v(x):=inf
i∈I
˜ g
v
i (x).
Proposition 9.4. gv
i (x) ≤ ˜ gv
i (x) = EPi[u0
i(v)]EQv
i[x].
Proof. By Proposition 9.3 and Lemma 5.1,
g
v
i (x) ≤ −(ah −g
v
i )(x) = lim
λ→∞
λg
v
i (x/λ) = lim
λ→∞
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and the integrand is nondecreasing in λ. By the monotone convergence theorem, this equals
EPi
h
lim
λ→∞
λ(ui(v + x/λ) − ui(v))
i
= EPi[u
0
i(v)x] = EPi[u
0
i(v)]EQv
i[x].

The following preparatory proposition gives a more useful representation for consistent
pricing kernels. We saw in Proposition 5.4(4) that consistent pricing kernels are dominated
by market prices π and in A∗ = (A∨)∗. In this setting where A = A(Gv), we may be able
to focus on a more easily analyzed set, A( ˜ Gv)∗. The fundamental theorems of Carr et al.
(CGM01) involve existence and uniqueness of a “representative state pricing function,” which
is a strictly positive linear combination of all the valuation measures, that is, it gives strictly
positive weight to each one. It also agrees with the market prices, which are assumed linear
in that paper. Here we will call a nonnegative linear combination µ =
P
i∈I λiQv
i, where
λi ≥ 0, a representative pricing kernel; we do not call it a state pricing function because the
state space Ω is not ﬁnite here. The reason for the diﬀerence of positive versus nonnegative
coeﬃcients is that the criterion of “no strictly acceptable opportunities” in (CGM01) is, in
our notation, {x|∃i ∈ I 3 gv
i (x) > 0}∩A(Gv)∩M = ∅: one can not get for free a claim that
appears at least as good as the status quo under all outlooks, and strictly better under at
least one. This diﬀers from our conditions involving arbitrages or cashouts.
Proposition 9.5. The set A( ˜ Gv) is a closed cone containing A(Gv)∨, and A( ˜ Gv)∗ is the
set of representative pricing kernels. If ∀x,infi∈I u0
i(x) > 0, then A( ˜ Gv) = cl(A(Gv)∨), and
A(Gv)∗
∨ = A( ˜ Gv)∗.
Proof. First we show A( ˜ Gv) is closed. The complement of A( ˜ Gv) is {x|∃i 3 ˜ gv
i (x) < 0}. For
such x and i, by Proposition 9.4, EQv
i[x] < 0. Pick δ ∈ (0,−EQv
i[x]). Then the δ-ball at x is
contained in the complement of A( ˜ Gv).
Next, because A( ˜ Gv) = {x|∀i ∈ I,EQv
i(x) ≥ 0}, it is a cone. As a closed cone of this
form, its polar cone A( ˜ Gv)∗ is the cone generated by {Qv
i}i∈I (Roc70§14), i.e. the set of
representative pricing kernels. From the inequality in Proposition 9.4, A(Gv) ⊆ A( ˜ Gv). But
A(Gv)∨ is the smallest cone containing A(Gv), so A(Gv)∨ ⊆ A( ˜ Gv).
Now supposing ∀x,infi∈I u0
i(x) > 0, we show A( ˜ Gv) ⊆ cl(A(Gv)∨), which implies A( ˜ Gv) =
cl(A(Gv)∨). Consider x ∈ A( ˜ Gv), i.e. ˜ gv
i (x) ≥ 0 for all i. For any δ > 0 and i,
lim
λ→∞
λg
v
i ((x + δ)/λ) = ˜ g
v
i (x + δ)
= ˜ g
v
i (x) + ˜ g
v
i (δ)
≥ 0 + EPi[u
0
i(v)]EQv
i[δ]
≥ δ inf
i∈I
u
0
i(supv) > 0.
Therefore, for λ suﬃciently large, gv
i ((x + δ)/λ) is positive for all i, i.e. (x + δ)/λ ∈ A(Gv).
This implies x + δ ∈ A(Gv)∨. As this is true for all δ > 0, x is an accumulation point of
A(Gv)∨, i.e. x ∈ cl(A(Gv)∨).26 JEREMY STAUM
Finally, because A(Gv)∨ ⊆ A( ˜ Gv), A( ˜ Gv)∗ ⊆ A(Gv)∗
∨. It remains to show that A(Gv)∗
∨ ⊆
A( ˜ Gv)∗. Consider Q ∈ A(Gv)∗
∨ and x ∈ A( ˜ Gv). As before, for all δ > 0, x + δ ∈ A(Gv)∨, so
EQ[x + δ] ≥ 0. This implies EQ[x] ≥ 0. 
As mentioned in the preceding proof, a representative pricing kernel Q ∈ A( ˜ Gv)∗ ⊆
A(Gv)∗
∨, so if EQ ≤ π, then Q is also consistent. Now the 0th fundamental theorem tells us
how to choose the outlooks so that the pricing scheme avoids giving away cashouts: make
sure that there is a consistent representative pricing kernel.
Proposition 9.6. The existence of a consistent representative pricing kernel is suﬃcient
for NC(π,aπ,A(Gv)). If 1 ⊆ ˜ R−L+, π is convex, and ∀x,infi∈I u0
i(x) > 0, the converse holds.
Proof. By Theorem 6.1, the existence of a consistent representative pricing kernel is suﬃcient
for NC(π,aπ,A(Gv)). By Proposition 9.3, A(Gv) is convex and contains 0. Now assume
the extra hypotheses. By Proposition 7.2, aπ∨,A(Gv)∨ is continuous. Then Theorem 6.1
asserts that the existence of a consistent pricing kernel is necessary for NC(π,aπ,A(Gv)). By
Proposition 9.5, A( ˜ Gv)∗ = A(Gv)∗
∨, so the consistent pricing kernel is representative. 
To avoid arbitrages, the key is to have a consistent representative pricing kernel that is
equivalent to the reference probability measure P, i.e. is strictly monotone.
Proposition 9.7. The existence of an equivalent consistent representative pricing kernel is
suﬃcient for NNA(π,aπ,A(Gv)). If 1 ⊆ ˜ R−L+, π is convex, and ∀x ∈ L+\{0},˜ aπ,A(Gv)(x) >
0, then it is equivalent to ∀x ∈ L+ \ {0},˜ aπ,A(Gv)(x) > 0.
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, but relying on Theorem 6.2. 
10. Calibration and Computation
We now consider how to construct a set of outlooks so that an equivalent consistent
representative pricing kernel exists, and how to compute bid and ask prices from this set.
We control the current random wealth v, the subjective measures Pi, and the utility functions
ui. Together, these determine the valuation measures Qv
i. The set of representative pricing
kernels is the cone generated by {Qv
i}i∈I, and we want this set to contain a measure Qv
that is equivalent to the reference probability measure P and consistent with market prices:
EQv ≤ π.
One expects that statistical analysis of data including historical price processes would yield
a subjective measure. Estimation could be done within a model always yielding measures
equivalent to P. Introspection or the use of an elicitation procedure would yield a utility
function. The presence of multiple outlooks models the imprecision in these estimates. It
seems plausible to argue that the outlooks should be chosen thus, to reﬂect only beliefs and
preferences, and not to be consistent with market prices. If so, the only way to ensure con-
sistency is to change one’s trading strategy in order to alter the random wealth v. Certainly
this is what a portfolio optimizer would do: take good deals until one’s appetite for them is
exhausted due to risk aversion, or up to the scale at which they disappear due to imperfect
liquidity, i.e. one’s impact on market prices.
Another approach, perhaps more appropriate to derivatives traders, is to set a policy of
believing that all marketed claims are unattractive when one holds a reference position v0,PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS 27
such as 0 or an investment in a money market account. Because marketed claims are typically
available at very small scale, it seems ineﬀectual to attempt to accomplish this through choice
of the utility functions: ﬁnite risk-aversion will not prevent risky investment while accepting
risky hedging residuals. Instead, one could let market prices, possibly in conjunction with
historical data, determine the choice of measures Pi in the outlooks. For instance, one
might perform statistical estimation from historical data subject to the constraint that an
equivalent consistent representative pricing kernel Qv0 exist.
Regarding computation, it seems desirable to have a ﬁnite number |I| of outlooks. This is
also attractive for theoretical reasons: it ensures that the uniformity conditions on marginal
utility and Radon-Nikodym derivative hold. With a ﬁnite number of outlooks, in a one-
period economy with ﬁnitely many marketed securities, linear programming makes eﬃcient
computation possible, as explained by Augustin (Aug02). Given the diﬃculty of comput-
ing optimal continuous-time hedging strategies even in a complete market, it is not to be
expected that such a simple solution exists outside the one-period case. However, the sto-
chastic dynamic programming method for approximate computation of hedging strategies in
incomplete markets of Bertsimas et al. (BKL01) is encouraging.
11. Conclusions and Directions
This paper oﬀers a methodology for using imprecise beliefs and preferences to determine
arbitrage-free prices and corresponding hedging strategies in incomplete markets. It is in-
tended to be more robust than expected utility maximization while providing price bounds
more useful than no-arbitrage. The results include extension of Jaschke and K¨ uchler’s (JK00)
ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing, and a generalization (of a slight modiﬁcation) of
the system of Carr et al. (CGM01), with additional economic grounding.
Several tasks remain before this methodology can become practical. We require eﬃcient
and reliable algorithms for computation and calibration. It would even seem that further
attention should be paid to the philosophical basis for calibration of a scheme that involves
beliefs, preferences, and hedging costs to data including current market prices of derivatives
as well as price histories. For instance, our suggestion of performing statistical estimation
from historical data, subject to a no-arbitrage constraint imposed by current market prices of
derivatives, is not wholly satisfactory. One is tempted to argue that derivatives prices reﬂect
aggregate beliefs about the future evolution of underlying price processes, and that this
information should be incorporated into one’s outlooks, not merely used as a constraint. On
the other hand, market prices reﬂect not only participants’ beliefs, but also their preferences
given their portfolios, which complicates matters.
It would also be of interest to extend this framework, which at present is quite restricted
with respect to risk and ambiguity attitudes. The representation of a coherent or convex
risk measure as an inﬁmum expresses extreme ambiguity aversion: a worst-case analysis
among all plausible measures, taking no account of perspectives that make a risk seem more
attractive (Aug02). Furthermore, the sharpness of the distinction between plausible and
implausible measures (for instance, those that are or are not consistent pricing kernels) is
displeasing. These objections may point the way to fruitful generalizations.28 JEREMY STAUM
We have also given necessary conditions for this pricing scheme to avoid arbitrage only
under some convexity hypotheses. Given the nature of convex optimization, this seems
diﬃcult to avoid. However, it might be worthwhile to consider the possibility of risk-seeking
behavior (nonconvex acceptance sets) on the part of agents, such as derivatives traders,
who participate economically in their trading gains to a greater extent than in their losses.
An understanding of the incentives faced by such agents, and the objectionable behavior
that may result, could lead to improved risk control systems. With regard to convexity of
market prices, it would be desirable to know whether and to what extent market prices are
nonconvex, and what impact that has.
Moreover, the use of the market price function π obscures potentially important and
challenging aspects of market modelling. A key issue not addressed in the present paper is
the relationship between admissible, self-ﬁnancing continuous-time trading strategies and the
market price of attainable contingent claims. This gives the paper a one-period ﬂavor that
is typical of recent research on coherent and convex risk measures, but does not do justice
to the richness of continuous-time ﬁnance, particularly not to the fundamental theorems of
asset pricing described by Delbaen and Schachermayer (1999). To demonstrate the value of
this methodology requires some examples in which it produces practical bid-ask intervals for
interesting unattainable claims in realistic incomplete markets with continuous-time trading.
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